an erosion of the traditional association of citizenship and nationality.
The word "society" is relatively neutral, at least to lawyers, and it offers the advantage of allowing one to speak simultaneously of Germany and the United States. The United States and Germany have much in common from a traditional constitutional standpoint in that they belong to one western, essentially European, democratic political and economic society. However, it would stretch the political vocabulary to speak of Germany and the United States as having common citizenship and government, even though corporate ownership and control and much else in economic society do not respect political boundaries.
The term "hierarchy" is employed instead of "paradigm" or even "institution." This is not because "hierarchy" denotes the entirety of society's present or future. "Paradigm" might be better for this purpose. The word "hierarchy" does not, for example, capture the complexity and beauty of a constitutional order dedicated to the pursuit of liberty and equality. Nor does the word "hierarchy" do justice to the richness and simplicity of free enterprise and the unabashed pursuit of wealth and happiness. Rather, speaking in terms of "hierarchy" allows one to see more clearly that societal norms and values can be relegated to different positions relative to each other. Use of the term "hierarchy" thus permits a readier comparison between the relative importance within German and American society of the values of speech and competition.
Finally, this article prefers the term "influence" over other terminology often employed in constitutional scholarship, such as "power," "regulate," and "control," because these concepts imply the threat or use of force. As such, these terms are not subtle enough to explain the extent to which commerce permeates our society and is replacing traditional institutions and values.
The broad brush "influence" is particularly apropos for this article's first and third parts. The first part describes in general terms the transformation of epochs-the "paradigm shift"-while the third part consults historical antecedents to divine perspectives on the future. These two parts are impressionistic in nature, somewhat like a painting by Claude Monet. The second part of this article scrutinizes decisions of the highest courts in the United States and Germany dealing with political boycotts. The comparisons made in this second part describe in a somewhat legalistic fashion the relevant legal norms and their relative positions in the constitutional value systems of the United States and Germany. To remain with the metaphor of painting, the second part would resemble a pen and ink drawing by Albrecht Direr. 
Staatsangeherigkeitdurch den Standesbeamten, 52 DAS STANDESAMT 257 (1999).

2001]
IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
I. CHANGE IN EPOCHS: THE EPOCH OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
In order to provide a general context for what follows, the first part of this article chronicles in cursory fashion the commercialization of society, of the law, and of the state. As noted above, this process is gradual. Nevertheless, examples from all three sectors-society in general, law, and the state--demonstrate a relative increase in the influence of commerce and a concomitant decline in that of the state.
A.
Commercialization of Society
The commercialization of society surrounds us. Commercial advertisements await us in the mailbox, on the doorknob, on walls, on busses, on television, in newspapers, in E-mail, and sometimes written in the sky itself. We hear commercial advertisements on the radio, on the telephone, from loudspeakers, and from merchants hawking their wares. Perfumed advertising flyers fall from magazines to assault our noses. Over and above the commercial assault on our pocketbooks is the more subtle suggestion to our psyches that anything expensive is good, whether food, clothing, transportation, housing, carpeting, vacation, or education. The free market has become the yardstick for society. The desirability and status of a position are measured by its salary. The prominence and importance of authors, artists, and athletes are measured by what they earn or what their art pieces and manuscripts bring at auction.
Just a few years ago, professional athletes were not allowed to compete in the Olympic Games. Athletes were supposed to represent their nationstates, not themselves or petty commercial interests. 7 Commercialism was considered common and base. It had no place among the high virtues exemplified by the Olympic spirit. Today, such considerations appear outdated, even cynical and hypocritical, considering the commercial exploits of the Olympic committee members
B. Commercialization of the Law
People do not trust the government to organize their lives and affairs as they once did. For example, prenuptial agreements are replacing statutory and common law marriage laws. Fewer and fewer people rely on the laws of intestate succession. Adoptions are opened as people bypass state strictures. university course work. As in the United States, the state does not even regulate who can offer these courses, even though the courses train students to pass the examination which is a state prerequisite to admission to the bar. The state seems unwilling if not unable to respond to the forces of commercialization.
Through its membership in the European Union, the German state is losing exclusive control over admission of lawyers to practice law. A "race to the bottom," which is decried in the environmental arena,"' is also perceptible in the education of lawyers. " Another development, perhaps even more momentous and ominous, is the appearance of foreign legal advisors who counsel their clients on foreign or global law. Large CPA firms in the United States are employing lawyers in large numbers. Many contend that they are not practicing law and as such are not subject to state regulation.
C.
Commercialization of Government
In the present political climate, government apparently cannot be trusted to run post offices, schools, prisons, 9 or even police forces. Private police officers outnumber public officers in most western countries. 2 " In the United States, business executives are transforming large portions of a fragmented, cottage industry of independent, non-profit institutions into consolidated, professionally managed, moneymaking businesses. 2 -Even state universities and public elementary schools 22 have become commercial ventures, while the states are reduced to running lotteries to support local schools. Public primary schools were once thought to exist to train good citizens. 23 judges of the U.S. Supreme Court determined that primary school education was so "inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy" ' 24 that Congress could regulate guns on school grounds under its commerce power. 25 Private home owners' associations make quasi-governmental decisions for their members. Unions do the same thing in Germany, but on a much larger scale. American lawyers spend huge amounts of money to manipulate legislation in their commercial self-interest. 26 The new hierarchy of private enterprise has long been in the process of founding its own courts, consisting of arbitrators, rent-a-judges, and the like. International courts of arbitration are sometimes staffed by "judges" who never studied law or served as a judge in any particular jurisdiction. In this way the state is losing its traditional influence over the resolution of disputes, and simultaneously over the development of the common law. Companies and conglomerates on the international level increasingly subject themselves to their own lex mercatoria, 2 which is not subject to the legislative jurisdiction of any particular state. 29 The very institution of democracy appears to be threatened by commercialization 3° and thus by free enterprise. Political campaigns have become marketing campaigns in which the most influential positions in the body politic are up for sale to the highest bidder. 2001] be predicted-perhaps made superfluous-by private political polls. Voter turnouts are at historic lows, as was recently witnessed for the elections to the European Parliament. 3 The cause of lower voter turnout is not apathy, but rather the superfluousness of the state, 32 since the influence of the state and its politics on the individual has been diminishing rapidly. As is graphically said, people vote with their feet. Nowadays they vote with their wallets, as often as they like. One euro, or one dollar, one vote.
The principle of equality is giving way to the principle of competition, which only concerns itself with equality of opportunity, not results. The notion that conditions should be the same for everyone in society appears ludicrous when judged by this principle, for competition necessarily implies both winners and losers. The losers in this new hierarchy, such as those on welfare, will favor the traditional state with its welfare system. The winners will see the welfare state at best as a necessary evil, an institution that must be funded, lest civil unrest result. 37 The motor driving this development is private enterprise. Lawyers who cling to an old-fashioned notion of the state are being left behind.
II. CONFRONTATION BETWEEN HIERARCHIES: POLITICAL BOYCOTrS
One way to trace the evolution from a constitutional governmental hierarchy to a private enterprise society is to describe the gradual alterations in institutions. One could, for example, examine the confrontation between these two hierarchical systems by comparing the judicial systems of the states to the dispute resolution tribunals of arbitration and mediation. Or, one could compare principles of democracy with those of private enterprise. Antitrust law contains much of the institutional law of the hierarchy of the future in rudimentary form. One could compare the constitutional principle of separation of powers to the prohibition against horizontal monopolization, for example. The principle of federalism and its corollary, subsidiarity, can be glimpsed in antitrust's prohibition against vertical monopolization. For purposes of this article, however, the study will address the area of civil rights, specifically, the right of free speech versus the right of free competition as seen in the judicial decisions of Germany and the Unites States regarding calls for political boycotts. In Germany, constitutional rights for the most part are listed in the catalogue of rights in the German Constitution or "Basic Law." In the U.S. Constitution, most are found in the amendments. Private enterprise does not yet possess a similar catalogue.
3
" But many norms analogous to civil rights can be found in the law of unfair competition. 
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A. Political Boycotts in Perspective
If one were to choose one single constitutional right to typify and define the democratic state, it would be freedom of speech. This freedom is protected in the Fifth Article 39 of the German Constitution and in the First Amendment' to the U.S. Constitution. A liberal democratic state would be unimaginable if freedom of speech were not protected. As the German Federal Constitutional Court stated in its lth case: [The right of free speech] is absolutely necessary to liberal democracy because it makes possible the constant intellectual exchange, the battle of opinions, which is its life's blood. In a certain sense it is the foundation of every liberty, "the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom" (Cardozo).
4 '
For purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to delve into the intricacies of various constitutional protections and to make differentiations in Germany between freedom of press, opinion, 4 2 assembly, and association, 4 3 or in the United States between freedom of speech, press, association, and petition, as expressed in the First Amendment. This study is concerned with the priority enjoyed by freedom of speech (using the more inclusive American terminology) relative to rights of private enterprise. It attempts to ascertain whether, and to what extent, rights of private enterprise diminish freedom of speech. In other words, which principle 44 is entitled to more respect? Free competition is the free speech of the free enterprise system. It is the policy that is the most important; the most fundamental to private enterprise is perhaps that of competition. For competition to be free, it must be fair. Underhanded, false, or otherwise unfair competition clouds comparisons and distorts the market. possesses the right freely to express and disseminate her opinion in speech, writing, and illustrations, and to inform herself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom to report in broadcasts and film are guaranteed. There shall be no censorship."
40. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof-or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 43. Freedom of assembly is guaranteed by Article 8 of the German Constitution and freedom of association by Article 9. GRUNDGESETL [GGl[Constitution] arts. 8,9 (F.R.G).
44. In this article the terms principle, value, and policy are used interchangeably unless the context indicates otherwise.
[Vol. 11:2 FREE SPEECH MEETS FREE ENTERPRISE Prohibitions against unfair trade practices are found in statutory and common law. In Germany, the statutes most relevant to the cases digested below are §826 of the Civil Code, 4 ' which imposes liability for intentional, immoral activities, and § 1 of the Law Against Unfair Trade Practices,' which accords a right to compensatory and injunctive relief against one who violates moral standards of business for purposes of trade competition. Comparable causes of action in the United States include the following: (1) § 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 prohibiting combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade; (2) §8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act," prohibiting secondary boycotts; (3) tortious interference with business relationships 49 ; (4) trade or "product disparagement" pursuant to §623A-" of the Restatement (Second) of 
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 623A (1977) states:
One who publishes a false statement harmful to the interests of another is subject to liability for pecuniary loss resulting to the other if (a) he intends for publication of the statement to result in harm to interests of the other having pecuniary value, or either recognizes or should recognize that it is likely to do so, and (b) he knows that the statement is false or acts in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. 51. This is cited and discussed in, for example, David J. The United States Supreme Court follows a uniform approach to cases involving freedom of speech when they involve "matters of public concern." 53 According to this approach, statements of opinion are absolutely protected regardless of how vicious or malicious. Regardless of their effect, statements of fact enjoy equivalent protection only if they are true, or at least not demonstrably false. Even false statements of fact are protected under the U.S. approach if they have been uttered in good faith, that is, they were not published with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity.' To put it into the vernacular, according to the Supreme Court, the First Amendment protects the most outrageous statements of opinion on matters of public concern, and also protects fools who are even negligently ignorant of the facts; however, it does not protect outright liars.
By contrast, the German Federal Constitutional Court has never expressly accorded priority to freedom of speech above privacy rights and other values, although it recognizes that expressions uttered on a matter of substantial public moment (eine die Offentlichkeit wesentlich beruihrende Frage) are entitled to a presumption of protection under the Fifth Article. 55 According to the German Federal Constitutional Court, the rights of the speaker must always be weighed against those of the person being injured by his speech; however, in undertaking this balance, the court accords wider latitude to statements of opinion than it does to false statements of fact. 56 As In order to narrow the subject of this study," 8 and hopefully to make the comparison more interesting, the discussion below concentrates on political boycotts, that is, boycotts that do not confer a direct commercial advantage on the person calling for the boycott. 59 For purposes of this study, political boycott is defined as any statement addressed to the public by someone who is not in competition with the subject of the boycott and which has as its purpose the impairment of the business of another.' By restricting the discussion to boycotts that meet this definition, it is hoped that democratic, political interests on the one hand, and commercial interests on the other, can be brought into closer focus. The definition intentionally excludes critical comments made by competitors in the marketplace, whether or not these comments be factual in nature, or merely opinions, and whether or not the statements be true or false. This is done in order to heighten the conflict between the values of democracy and those of commerce. To repeat, to constitute a call for political boycott under the definition employed in this study, there must be (1) a statement of fact or opinion; (2) directed to the public; (3) by one who is not in competition with the subject of the boycott; and (4) which has as its purpose the impairment of the business of the subject of the boycott, particularly by persuading others not to buy the products or use the services of that person. Most would agree... that boycotts are in general entitled to a high degree of protection under the freedoms of speech and of the press, or perhaps that they even enjoy priority over the rights of the person being boycotted, as long as the boycott 'is not based on commercial self-interest but rather on concern for political, commercial, social, or cultural interests of the public' and as such serves 'to inform public opinion.' Id.
61. They were directed to the public by an organization (Greenpeace) which was not in competition with Shell. The purpose of the action was to impair Shell's business by dissuading people from buying Shell's products, particularly gasoline. Greenpeace was successful, but the matter never reached the courts. The second example is from the United States. That was the case of the American beef industry against television hostess Oprah Winfrey. Discussion of that case is deferred until after a comparison of the basic principles from case law in the United States and Germany relative to political boycotts. The cases discussed below concern an area of law in which constitutional protections are extended to what appear to be private transactions. In Germany, this extension is known as Drittwirkung. 4 In the United States, this topic is ordinarily addressed under the "state action doctrine," although Drittwirkung is a broader concept. 6 5 According to explicit textual provisions in the constitutions of both countries, constitutional rights are designed to protect people only against the state, and not against private actors. However, there are many exceptions to this doctrine, as can be seen from the following comparisons. 
B. The Superiority of Political Speech
Research of both German laws and the laws of the United States reveals that political speech (i.e., speech on a matter of public concern by a commercially disinterested person), that is not demonstrably false, enjoys superiority over claims of commercial harm. This superiority is seen most clearly in the Lilth and NOW cases discussed below. The discussion in this section will also address the Oprah Winfrey case, which illustrates the difficulty in distinguishing between opinion on matters of public concern, which is always protected, and statements of fact, which are entitled to less protection if they are not true.
Germany
The seminal case in Germany on the meaning and extent of the constitutional protection of speech is the so-called Li'th case, decided by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1958. 66 In that case, Herr Loth, president of the Hamburg Press Club, 67 addressed an audience of film distributors and producers at the opening of the "Week of the German Film" in Hamburg. In his speech, he pleaded with film distributors and theater owners to boycott an innocuous romantic film Unsterbliche Geliebte ("Immortal Beloved") because the film had been directed by the leading director of National Socialist films, Viet Harlan. In calling for the boycott, Herr Loth said, among other things:
[The director and writer of the anti-Semitic film Jud Suii ("The Jew 'Sweet"')" is] the least capable person of all to restore [the moral reputation of the 2001] of time during the Hitler regime and that his film Jud Sif made him one of the most important exponents of the murderous anti-Semitism of the Nazis."
In fact, these statements by Herr Ltlth were not quite accurate, for the not-guilty verdict was not "purely formal" in nature. In finding Viet Harlan not guilty, the court in Hamburg concluded that, had he refused to work on the film Jud SUif, he probably would have suffered bodily harm or even death. Accordingly, Viet Harlan was found not guilty because he had acted under duress. Nevertheless, despite the inaccuracies in Herr LUth's report, his statements were found to enjoy the protection of the German Constitution. The court held that:
[bly summarizing his impression of the content of the judgment of the court in the words "formal acquittal" and "morally damning," [Herr Lith] was not, in the opinion of the Federal Constitutional Court, exceeding the allowable boundary for public discussion of a topic of serious substance. It would constitute an unreasonable limitation of freedom of speech in a liberal democracy to demand... that [Herr Lith], who is not a lawyer, should use the care of a "reader schooled in the criminal law," which would have led him to eschew the characterization "formal acquittal," because that term is [technically] only permissible when the court finds a lack of the objective prerequisites to criminal punishment. The descriptions chosen by [Herr LUith] are not statements of fact whose truth or falsity could be proven; indeed, "formal acquittal" does not describe unambiguous findings of fact. What we are faced with is a conclusory, judgmental characterization of the content of the entire judgment. This must be accepted as proper because it is neither injurious in form nor so contrary to the facts as necessarily to cause misunderstandings of the content of the judgment in his listeners and readers. This might, for example, be the case if one were to speak without further explanation of someone who had been found not guilty as having been "convicted".... The statement of [Herr LUth] can therefore not be likened to cases in which one calls for a boycott by spreading a short description of a factual situation which cannot be properly understood by those to whom it is addressed. 7 To summarize Lilth, the case concerned a call for a political boycott that was entitled to constitutional protection. The call included both statements of opinion and statements of fact. The court had no trouble recognizing an absolute right to utter one's opinions ("Herr Harlan is the least capable person imaginable to help restore the moral reputation of the German film industry.") However, the court was troubled by factual inaccuracies. Still it apparently allowed these because they were either inextricably mixed with elements of opinion 2 (' The judgment was morally damning."), or because they were not seriously misleading ("The verdict of not guilty was purely formal in nature.") The Federal Constitutional Court seems to imply that Herr Lith's call for a boycott would not have been protected if he had seriously misled his readers and listeners by a misstatement of material fact.
United States
When researching American case law, clear boundaries must be set to avoid losing one's way in a forest of court decisions. The large number of cases in this field is due in large measure to the large number of legislative bodies, specifically the legislatures of the fifty states, that are actively involved in regulating commerce. The large number of cases is also due in part to the jurisdiction enjoyed by all courts, even state trial courts, to hear constitutional arguments and to strike down laws as unconstitutional." In Germany, by contrast, the power to hold statutes unconstitutional resides solely in the German Federal Constitutional Court. 74 Rather than attempt to collect every reported decision involving the conflict between free speech and free enterprise in the United States, 75 this article restricts itself primarily to the federal law of antitrust and unfair trade practices, where the federal courts enjoy exclusive jurisdiction. 7 6 Accordingly, this article limits itself to decisions of the federal courts, primarily to those of the U.S. Supreme Court. The most important decisions of that Court are discussed first.
The American case that compares most closely to the facts of the Liith decision is Missouri v. National Organization for Women (NOW)." At issue 
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was a boycott that was purely political in nature, that is, where the group calling for the boycott was not in competition with the industry at which the boycott was aimed, and where the matter was one of public concern.
In 1977, NOW joined a number of other organizations by lobbying its members and other like-minded organizations not to hold conventions and meetings in states that had not yet ratified the Equal Rights Amendment. The State of Missouri filed an action in federal court under § 1 of the Sherman Act alleging an unlawful combination to restrain trade. The district court ruled that the boycott was politically motivated and thus enjoyed the protection of the First Amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court denied review, letting the decision stand."' Comparing U.S. and German case law as sketched to this point, calls for boycotts are protected in both countries where the group or person calling for the boycott is not in competition with the group or person at which the boycott is aimed, and where the grounds for the boycott is a matter of public concern.
Before turning to a discussion of boycotts called for by competitors, what of the disparate treatment of statements of fact and statements of opinion? For example, in the Lath case, the German Federal Constitutional Court said of the statements of Herr Ltith: "The descriptions chosen by [Herr Liith] are not statements of fact whose truth or falsity could be proven [but rather] a conclusory, judgmental characterization."' This demarcation between statements of fact and of opinion is employed by both the U.S. Supreme Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court.° And it is criticized by legal scholars in both countries. 8 ' The primary criticism is that the differentiation between statements of fact and statements of "mere" opinion is often impossible or nearly impossible to make. Nevertheless, in the United States even false statements of fact are protected [Vol. 11:2 FREE SPEECH MEETS FREE ENTERPRISE by the Constitution if they are not intentionally false, or if the speaker has not intentionally failed to investigate their truth or falsity. 2 Thus, even when calling for a boycott that is purely political, if the group calling for the boycott intentionally makes false factual statements that are material to the boycott, that particular speech is not protected by the Constitution. If, however, the facts though false are uttered by someone who is merely negligent in ascertaining the truth, the utterance is protected by the Constitution. As described above, the decision in the Lith case comes to the same conclusion, even though it employs different reasoning. In other words, the holdings of the case decisions of the two courts concerning political boycotts are identical in their result if not their reasoning.
The difficulties encountered in the fact/opinion distinction are illustrated by the famous case against Oprah Winfrey, 83 in which the well-known television star and her network were sued for criticizing the safety of beef.
Before reviewing the facts of the case, some background information may be necessary. Twelve American states, including Texas, have enacted "food slander" legislation that in one form or another forbids the publication of false information on agricultural products." M This legislation is traceable to an episode of the 60 Minutes in 1989 which reported that a substance (daminozide) sprayed on apples in the State of Washington was a potential carcinogen." 5 An organization of Washington apple producers sued CBS, the network that broadcasts 60 Minutes, alleging that their products had been disparaged. According to the common law product-disparagement cause of action, the organization had to prove that the network knowingly published false information in order to impair the business of the apple growers. The organization of apple growers lost the case, in part because it could not prove that the network knew the report to be false.
In reaction to this decision, the legislatures of a number of American states enacted legislation to allow the recovery of damages in cases of agricultural disparagement even where publication was not knowingly false. Oprah Winfrey was claimed to have violated such a law when she said on camera in Texas that "[This information] has just stopped me cold from eating another hamburger. I'm stopped."86 She said this after she had been informed 82. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964 by a vegetarian and "food advocate" about the risk of Kreuzfeldt-Jakob infection from eating beef.
Even if not familiar with the case, one can imagine the result: the consumption and therefore sale of beef dropped dramatically. But where is the legal problem? According to the American beef industry, the legal problem lay in the fact that there had not been a single case in the United States in which Kreuzfeldt-Jakob disease was found to have been transmitted from beef to human beings. The actual risk of infection was therefore virtually zero. 7 Should Oprah Winfrey's statement be considered a statement of fact or of opinion? If considered a statement of opinion, then it is entitled to absolute constitutional protection in the United States even if it had been uttered maliciously with intent to harm the beef industry, because the quality of food is a matter of public concern. However, if the statement is considered one of fact (that is, that beef is so dangerous that the consumption of a single hamburger represents an immediate risk of death), then the statement is false, and Oprah would have to defend herself by adducing evidence that she acted without knowledge of its falsity but rather negligently, for she cannot be held liable for negligent misstatements of fact under the case decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Oprah Winfrey case is not as far afield from the topic of political boycotts as might first appear, for the statement of Oprah Winfrey-whether factual or opinion-fits the definition of a political, that is, non-commercial, call for a boycott. Perhaps the element of intent is missing, but one could imagine a similar situation in which Oprah Winfrey says: "Do yourself and your family a favor, don't eat beef in any way, shape, or form!"
There is no decision of the highest court of either the United States or Germany which could be found to shed light on making the fact/opinion distinction in the area of political boycotts. Oprah prevailed before ajury, but the reasons for the decision are somewhat difficult to discern." 8 To this point, this analysis has made several general findings: First, the case decisions of both countries are in agreement as long as the politically motivated call for a boycott is restricted to the use of rhetoric that is not provably false. Next, statements of opinion are, by their nature, impossible to prove true or false, and are for that reason protected. 89 
C. Competitors' Speech Distinguished
The discussion thus far has examined calls for boycotts on matters of public concern by persons or groups who are not in competition with the subject of the boycott and who therefore do not stand to gain directly from the boycott. This Article refers to these boycotts as "political." As described above, they are entitled to protection as long as they are truthful. But what of boycotts called for by competitors? Are their utterances unprotected because of their commercial stake? Or does democratic governance compel protection even of competitors' opinions and truthful statements on matters of public concern?
The German Federal Constitutional Court faced these issues in the socalled "Reminder Notice" case 9° at the end of the 1970s. A trade organization for small retail stores was concerned about competition from large chain stores. The trade organization had been informed that certain manufacturers were selling their products to chain stores at reduced prices even though the manufacturers had promised to deal exclusively with the small retail stores. In reaction, the trade organization called for what amounted to a boycott. It included a "Reminder Notice" in a mailing to its members that asked members to list the names of offending manufacturers. It also suggested that the member stores stop carrying products from these manufacturers.
One supermarket chain challenged this action by the trade organization. The chain promptly obtained an injunction on the basis that the action constituted an unfair trade practice. The appellate court upheld the grant of injunction, whereupon the trade organization petitioned to the Federal Constitutional Court, claiming that its free speech rights had been violated.
The Federal Constitutional Court denied the petition, ruling that the action of the trade organization was not entitled to constitutional protection because the boycott had been for commercial, not political purposes. Truth of the factual assertions was therefore no defense. The court stressed that the trade organization had gone beyond merely informing its members by suggesting the boycott. It found that there was an underlying threat that those specialty stores that did not take part in the boycott would be barred from membership in the trade organization. Further, the court noted that the call for a boycott was not aimed at the public in general, but rather at specialty stores who constituted members of the trade organization. In short, the action 90. BVerfGE 62, 230 (1982) .
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was merely a commercial combination by one branch of retail stores against another, and as such was subject to prohibition. Those involved in enterprise cannot automatically invoke the protections afforded those involved in democratic government.
The case of Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight 9 similarly concerned less of a political boycott than a battle by one branch of the transportation sector against another to protect or expand market share. It was, therefore, a commercial and not a political struggle. However, the commercial (non-political) speakers were nonetheless entitled to First Amendment protection.
The case concerned a political battle between the railroads and the trucking industry. Fearing bankruptcy, members of the railway industry banded together and hired a public relations firm to conduct a campaign against the trucking industry. The campaign was directed at the public, to encourage the public to ship by rail rather than by truck, and also at legislators, to influence them to change the law. There was no direct use of market power, as in the Blinkfier case, discussed below,' nor was there any threat of the use of market power. Further, the railway industry occupied a decidedly subordinate position in the market. Thus, even though the battle was in the last analysis commercial, it was one that confined itself basically to the political arena. In response to the publicity campaign and the lobbying of the railway industry, the trucking industry brought an action under Section I of the Sherman Act," claiming that the railroads were employing an unfair trade practice. Specifically, they claimed that the contract they had entered into with the public relations firm was a contract in restraint of trade.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the trucking industry by finding the actions of the railroad companies to be protected by the First Amendment. 9 ' The Court held that, in order for democracy to work, the public and their representatives must be aware if a commercial branch is in desperate straits, even when being made aware of the financial situation might have adverse commercial consequences for competitors. 9 " Later decisions make clear that not every kind of public relations action is protected by the First Amendment, rather, only those that are primarily designed to inform the public-particularly those that have as their primary purpose bringing about a change in the law." While no comparable decision could be found in The violence and threats were contrary to the common law of Mississippi, and the NAACP denounced them. The Mississippi courts held that the violence so tainted the action as to render it illegal, but a unanimous U.S. Supreme Court reversed."°: Nonviolent participation in the boycott, as well as calls for the boycott and continuation of the boycott themselves, were ruled to be protected by the First Amendment. Presumably the action would not have been protected if the NAACP supported or encouraged the coercive means.
The involving a suit by an importer against a labor union. Reacting to news of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the leadership of the International Longshoremen's Association ordered its members not to unload Russian products from ships in American ports. An American importer of Russian products sued the union, claiming that the action of the longshoremen constituted an illegal secondary boycott pursuant to Section 8(b)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act.'" The trial court ruled that the union was validly exercising its constitutional rights. However, the Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court ruled against the union, even though the public actions of the union were of a purely political nature, the matter was of great public importance, and the union would not, directly or indirectly, benefit from the boycott. 05 The reasoning of the Supreme Court bears a striking resemblance to that of the German Federal Constitutional Court in the Blinkfier case."° The Court wrote, "Actions which have as their purpose not the use of communication but the use of compulsion are not protected by the First Amendment."'" In effect, the importer was asserting the rights of the union membership, which had no choice but to honor the "boycott." Indeed, since the union had a monopoly, no one had a choice not to comply. Presumably, individual calls for a boycott and individual action by longshoremen not acting under union compulsion would both have been constitutionally protected.
To summarize, American and German law are identical on this issue: although a boycott itself envisages the application of economic force, the
